International Centre for Defence and Security

The security of the Nordic and Baltic countries rests heavily on the transatlantic alliance and the rules-based international order. In recent years, however, these two pillars of foreign policy have weakened and become harder to reconcile, forcing the small states in the region into an uncomfortable, at times almost impossible, balancing act.

Following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the election of Donald Trump to a second presidential term in 2024, Denmark has transformed its security posture from super-Atlanticism to European hawkishness. Remaining a staunch supporter of the liberal international order and a close ally of the United States, Denmark now sees strong territorial defence and close cooperation with European partners as important tools for national security.

Like other small western democracies, Finland has benefited immensely from the rules-based international order established after World War II: both the universal framework that revolved around the United Nations system securing sovereign equality, non-aggression, and territorial integrity, and the ‘thicker’ US-led liberal order with its institutions built on principles of open trade, international criminal accountability, human rights, and alliance solidarity.

Estonia’s foreign policy has been shaped by its geopolitical vulnerability as a small state bordering its former 'imperial master' with revisionist ambitions. Informed by its own experience of occupation, Estonia values international law, particularly the norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, it recognises that international law alone cannot guarantee security. Transatlantic cooperation and European integration have therefore been key pillars of Estonia’s foreign policy since the 1990s.

As a small frontline state, Lithuania depends on institutions it cannot control, shifting Allied priorities, and uneven enforcement of international norms. The Trump–Zelensky confrontation and temporary suspension of US military assistance to Ukraine in early 2025 demonstrated the volatility of Washington’s policy. Lithuania’s response has been not to escape dependence, but to reorganise it by making external commitments more distributed, institutionalised, and durable.

Shelves in Ukrainian grocery stores have suddenly emptied. No eggs, no salt, no fruit, no vegetables, no dairy, but signs reading: "This product was destroyed by Russia." This was the consequence of a series of Russian strikes in late summer 2026. With Kyiv’s air defence stocks running low, missiles and drones have been hitting warehouses that service millions of Ukrainians, with striking precision.

Although the Icelandic vote does not concern EU membership itself, its implications extend well beyond the mid-Atlantic island.

NATO's Ankara summit showcased an alliance in transition. The European Allies and Canada are spending more to rebuild military capability and fill gaps left by a declining US role. NATO must now develop the political, military, and institutional arrangements that a genuinely Europeanised Alliance will need.

NATO Allies met in Ankara, Türkiye, where they were expected to present credible plans to reach the spending targets approved at the summit in The Hague last year. According to NATO’s latest figures, Allies were again able to increase their budgets; nevertheless, some still face obstacles to doing so.

While concentrated on Europe, and especially on Ukraine, Moscow’s drive to challenge the world order has a global dimension. A tool of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy with worldwide impact is information operations.