International Centre for Defence and Security

How can the NB8 manage its dependence on China in the green energy transition?

In response to the continuing threat from Russia and to US demands that they should assume primary responsibility for their own conventional deterrence and defence, NATO’s European Allies and Canada have set out to build “a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO”.

How to Thrive in the Agentic Era? Competitiveness. Security. Efficiency

How the EU can attain tech sovereignty in cooperation with the US

The American midterms have changed the balance of power in Washington. Democrats have won control of both chambers of Congress, with new majorities taking office in January. This will have significant implications for President Donald Trump’s domestic agenda and the conduct of American foreign policy. European Allies have reason to welcome renewed congressional scrutiny and opportunities for bipartisan cooperation on NATO, Russia, and Ukraine. But they should be careful about what they conclude from the election.

The Russian expert system is poorly equipped to produce independent, Ukraine-specific knowledge. The field has remained institutionally underdeveloped, heavily dependent on state structures, and shaped by a state-centric corporate culture. Russian experts often lack specialised competencies for studying Ukraine.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s intelligence ecosystem has redirected its priorities toward supporting the war effort while adapting to a more constrained and contested operational and strategic environment.

The security of the Nordic and Baltic countries rests heavily on the transatlantic alliance and the rules-based international order. In recent years, however, these two pillars of foreign policy have weakened and become harder to reconcile, forcing the small states in the region into an uncomfortable, at times almost impossible, balancing act.